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Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of budgetary uncertainty on the optimum
instrument for fiscal discipline. In addition to exogenous uncertainty,
with respect to both the savings and damages of the public deficit, the
model accommodates for externalities as a result of a multitier govern-
ment structure. Hence, the model approximates fiscal discipline measures
within federations and especially within a monetary union. Alternative
to the frequently proposed fiscal rule constraining the magnitude of the
public deficit, the paper sets forth a price control (i.e. a penalty) as a
policy instrument. The preferred instrument for fiscal discipline is found
to be dependent on the slopes of the marginal savings and damage curves,
the savings uncertainty and the correlation between uncertainty in savings
and damage as well as between member states’ savings shocks. In par-
ticular, strongly asymmetric shocks to budgetary policy run a borrowing
constraint undesirable. The latter is stressed as exceptionally disturb-
ing as EMU member states are still considered to be asymmetric in their
stochastics, while stressing borrowing constraints as the principal instru-
ment for fiscal discipline.
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1 Introduction
A consensus exists on the necessity for fiscal measures both in the short-run
and the long-run to safeguard the stability of public finances, while at the same
time not hampering economic recovery. A frequently proposed way of achieving
fiscal discipline is to implement fiscal rules or public borrowing constraints. For
instance, the golden rule of public finance adopted in the past in Germany and
the UK required running an overall balanced budget while allowing for debt-
financed investments. More recently, the Fiscal Compact further strengthened
the structural balance requirements of the medium-term objectives imposed on
EMU Member States.1
In the same vein, federal member states, such as Belgium, are confronted
with the challenge to allocate the required effort among their regions. A federal
government is not only concerned with overall sustainability of the federal state,
but is also inclined to prevent lower levels of government from running deficits
disadvantageous to other member states. To preclude externalities and avert
time-inconsistent behavior on the part of the federal government itself, regional
borrowing constraints are on the rise as well.
Obviously, quantitative borrowing constraints are just one possible control
instrument to achieve fiscal discipline. In order to cast light on what type of
instrument is optimal in practice, it is important to take the uncertainty accom-
panying fiscal policy into consideration. For instance, the benefit of an addi-
tional unit of austerity is often only partly revealed ex ante, although crucial in
the decision process. Notwithstanding its importance, budgetary uncertainty’s
impact on disciplinary policy has, so far, been left untouched in the literature.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to assess federal policy makers’ deci-
sions to achieve fiscal discipline among its member states using a model incorpo-
rating the uncertainty of both savings and damages of the deficit. Specifically,
the comparative advantage of a price instrument (i.e. a pecuniary penalty per
unit of deficit) over a quantitative borrowing constraint is derived in function
of the budgetary uncertainty. Consequently, a clear picture is provided of the
impact of budgetary uncertainty on the preferred measure for fiscal discipline in
federal countries as well as the case of supranational oversight of the members
of a monetary union.
Using a theoretical model specifying the stochastic regional savings of one
additional unit of deficit and the accompanying stochastic federal damages, the
preferred instrument for fiscal discipline is found to be dependent on the slopes
of the marginal savings and damage curves, the savings uncertainty and the
correlation between uncertainty in savings and damage. Moreover, the com-
parative advantage depends on the correlation between member states’ savings
shocks as well. In particular, strongly asymmetric shocks to budgetary policy
1Building on the fiscal provisions from the Stability and Growth Pact and the Six-Pack,
the main budgetary outcome of the Fiscal Compact (formally, the Treaty on Stability, Co-
ordination and Governance in the EMU) is a reduction of the medium-term objective for a
member state’s structural deficit to 0.5 per cent of GDP in case the country’s public debt
exceeds the 60 per cent debt threshold.
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runs a borrowing constraint undesirable. Therefore, the asymmetry in shocks
among (EMU) member states is found to prevent a quantity constraint from
functioning efficiently vis-a`-vis a penalty-based system.
The next section provides a basis for the contentious forces underlying disci-
plinary considerations and thus the marginal savings and damage curves of one
additional unit of deficit. Moreover, it presents the control instruments consid-
ered. Section 3 extends this framework by exploring the uncertainty accompa-
nying the savings and damage of a public deficit. It comprises the core model
of this paper, the derivation of the comparative advantages of the suggested
policy measures and a thorough discussion of the resulting policy implications
for both a federal and a supranational setting. Finally, section 4 provides some
concluding remarks.
2 Controlling Fiscal Indiscipline
2.1 Setup
In the fiscal control problem set out below the deficit, d, will be the control
variable. After all, the variable to be regulated in practice is most often the
budget balance. More specifically, structural fiscal discipline measures specify
their goals in terms of a maximum amount to borrow. Nonetheless, the corre-
sponding austerity measures (i.e. deficit reductions) can be easily derived from
the model too.
Consider a federation with N member states indexed n ∈ {1, ..., N}. As a
result, dt = (d1,t, ..., dN,t) will be an N-vector comprising all member states’
deficits at time t. Assume that regional governments only take into account
the consequences of their fiscal policy on their own state and ignore spillovers,
then the regional savings of a deficit in state n at time t can be represented as
sn,t(dn,t).
Next, take a second-order Taylor approximation of the member states’ sav-
ings functions around dˆt = (dˆ1,t, ..., dˆN,t):
s1,t(d1,t) ∼= s1,t(dˆ1,t) + ∂∂dˆ1,t s1,t(dˆ1,t) · (d1,t − dˆ1,t) +
1
2
∂2
∂dˆ21,t
s1,t(dˆ1,t) · (d1,t − dˆ1,t)2
...
sN,t(dN,t) ∼= sN,t(dˆN,t) + ∂∂dˆN,t sN,t(dˆN,t) · (dN,t − dˆN,t) +
1
2
∂2
∂dˆ2N,t
sN,t(dˆN,t) · (dN,t − dˆN,t)2
(1)
Hence, the marginal savings functions can be written as follows:
∂
∂d1,t
s1,t(d1,t) ∼= ∂∂dˆ1,t s1,t(dˆ1,t) +
∂2
∂dˆ21,t
s1,t(dˆ1,t) · (d1,t − dˆ1,t)
...
∂
∂dN,t
sN,t(dN,t) ∼= ∂∂dˆN,t sN,t(dˆN,t) +
∂2
∂dˆ2N,t
sN,t(dˆN,t) · (dN,t − dˆN,t).
(2)
The marginal savings functions convey the marginal savings of one additional
unit of deficit for each of the N member states. Examples of such savings are
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widespread: e.g. deficits provide leeway to reduce the distortions as a result of
(non-smoothed) taxation and the distributive effects in the presence of liquidity
constrained agents. As the savings for the member state of one additional unit of
deficit will therefore increase as the fiscal deficit is reduced further, the marginal
savings curves are downward sloping: ∂
2
∂d2n,t
sn,t(dn,t) < 0.
The damages of a deficit, on the other hand, ought to be mainly valued at the
federal level of government. In particular, one member states’ unsustainability
might be borne by other members in case of a default or a bailout in a federa-
tion. Therefore, a contradiction between the interests of different agents occurs.
While the member states only take their individual regional concerns (and hence
might burden other members) into account, the higher level of government will
be concerned with possible externalities. Therefore, the marginal damage func-
tion entails the damage to the federation as a whole when a member state runs
one additional unit of deficit. Thus, it represents the marginal benefits of one
additional unit of deficit reduction to the federation as a whole, including both
sustainability concerns and other social benefits or costs of reducing the deficit
not taken into account by the states themselves.
Formally, the objective function is represented as Dt(dt):
Dt(dt) ∼= Dt(dˆt)+∇Dt(dˆt)·(dt−dˆt)+ 1
2
(dt−dˆt)T ·H(Dt)nm(dˆt)·(dt−dˆt) (3)
linking vector dt at time t to the social benefits of reduction, with ∇Dt(dˆt) the
gradient, H(Dt)nm(dˆt) the Hessian of the scalar function and m ∈ {1, ..., N}.
By means of clarification, both are given in full in appendix A.1.
Consequently, the marginal damage of a deficit in state n at time t is ex-
pressed as follows,2
∂
∂dn,t
Dt(dt) ∼= ∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt) +∇dn,tDt(dˆt) · (dt − dˆt) (4)
where ∇dn,tDt(dˆt) is the nth row of the Hessian of Dt at dˆt. The union-wide
marginal damage is presumed to increase as the deficit increases: ∂
2
∂d2n,t
Dt(dt) >
0. The latter is in accordance with the empirical findings indicating increased
union wide interest rates as fiscal balances worsen and a higher debt stock is
accumulated.3
The aforementioned can be graphically illustrated as it is in figure 1. The
figure portrays the marginal damage (MD) and marginal savings (MS) of one
2The detailed derivation is included in appendix A.2
3The marginal damage function might be further differentiated according to for instance
member states’ membership of the core or periphery of the union or federation. That way
the Southern European member states’ sustainability concerns, distinct from those of the
core, can be taken into account separately via differing slopes. The resulting conclusions for
disciplinary policy instruments of such differentiation can be inferred from lemma 1 in section
3.2. As notation is already burdensome, the extension is left out without loss of generality.
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Figure 1: The (Marginal) Savings and Damages of the Regional Deficit for the
Federal Regulator
additional unit of deficit, with the fiscal deficit and the respective (marginal)
damages and savings of deficit reduction as axes.4
The functional properties are assumed to be as follows:
∂
∂dn,t
sn,t(dn,t) >
∂
∂dn,t
Dt(dt) (5)
if dn,t small enough. Thus, as commonly perceived, when larger and larger
budget surpluses are accrued, limiting fiscal policy becomes undesirable since
advisable public expenditures (e.g. social security, redistribution, public infras-
tructure and services) might be hampered. On the other end of the spectrum,
4Note that the maximum aggregate savings needs not coincide with the initially projected
deficit as depicted in figure 1. The marginal costs of a deficit reduction may just as well be
non-zero from the start.
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for dn,t sufficiently large:
∂
∂dn,t
sn,t(dn,t) <
∂
∂dn,t
Dt(dt). (6)
As the marginal benefits of reducing the public deficit exceed the marginal costs
of doing so, there is a need for fiscal discipline. To this end, two instruments to
restrict borrowings will be introduced in the next subsection.
2.2 Policy Instruments
Borrowing constraints are often proposed and implemented under multitier gov-
ernment as a measure to harden soft budget constraints (see e.g. Rodden et al.,
2003). To assign a quantitative borrowing constraint to each member state,
the federal authority solves
Max
dt
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
sn,t(dn,t)−Dt(dt)
]
. (7)
The regulator will enforce deficit levels in order to maximize the difference
between the member state specific savings of running deficits and the overall
damages to the federation of doing so. This optimization will result in dˆt, a N-
vector comprising a deficit rule dˆn,t for each region n, satisfying
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t) =
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt).
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As illustrated in figure 1, deficits exceeding level dˆt provide room for im-
provement. In that case, the damage of the deficit outweigh its savings and thus
reducing the deficit is preferred. Points to the left of dˆt, would impose relatively
too high savings for an additional unit of deficit and would encourage running
a higher deficit. Only where the marginal savings and marginal damages are
equalized, and thus the difference between the savings and the overall damages
of the deficit is maximized, a borrowing constraint would be optimal.
Alternatively, the regulator could set a pecuniary penalty to be paid per
unit of deficit. Pricing the public deficit has, however, been passed over in prac-
tice due to its pro-cyclical nature, for the disciplinary fee itself puts additional
strain on the deteriorated budget. Nonetheless, a price or penalty’s procyclical-
ity can be easily overcome by lagging the payment. Moreover, as shown below,
a penalty is not without use. In the deterministic model considered so far, there
is, however, no difference in the outcomes achieved via both instruments.
In case a price control p˜n,t is used, marginal damages are fixed such that
marginal savings will not exceed this level when the states choose their deficit
level. Consequently, member state n will adjust its path of future fiscal balances
5If the regulatory authority would be indifferent between an additional unit of austerity in
member state i and member state j, a uniform borrowing constraint for all countries could be
set. From an economic efficiency point of view this would be a strong restriction on policy.
Accordingly, the model is kept more general by respecting heterogeneity and keeping this as
a subset.
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{dn,t} to the respective level hn,t(p˜n,t), given the p˜n,t chosen by the federal
authority. In particular, the price constraints p˜t = (p˜1,t, ..., p˜N,t) enforced by
the federal government are the result of the following optimization problem:6
Max
pt
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
sn,t(hn,t(pn,t))−Dt(ht(pt))
]
, (8)
implying
∂
∂hn,t
sn,t(hn,t(p˜n,t)) · ∂
∂p˜n,t
hn,t(p˜n,t) =
∂
∂hn,t
Dt(ht(p˜t)) · ∂
∂p˜n,t
hn,t(p˜n,t) (9)
However, using the marginal savings equations (2) and the fact that the price
will equal the marginal savings in equilibrium, it is straightforward to show
that hn,t(p˜n,t) ∼= dˆn,t and both policy instruments lead to the same outcome in
a deterministic setting. A result that is also inferred easily from figure 1.
3 Budgetary Uncertainty
3.1 Simultaneous and Asymmetric Uncertainty
There is a considerable amount of uncertainty in the ex ante expected savings
and damages of the deficit. Budgetary uncertainty results from a multiplicity
of causes.
The savings for the member state of an additional unit of deficit, for exam-
ple, depend on the desirability of the new public expenditures and the impact
on output. These are dependent on the size of the fiscal multiplier, which itself
is ambiguous and determined in its value by other variables (e.g. the marginal
propensity to consume). In general, the higher the multiplier is, the more desir-
able the deficit will be. Similarly, the distributive impact of austerity depends
on the measures taken. Moreover, shifts in distortionary taxes will bring about
an excess burden driven by uncertain microeconomic factors. In its turn, the
electoral cycle and process will determine the perceived political costs of reduc-
ing the deficit and is subject to the woes of politicians. Consequently, given the
member states’ uncertainty concerning the savings of the deficit (θn,t), the ex
post realizations may differ greatly from their ex ante expectations.
The federal government’s uncertainty with respect to the damages of an ad-
ditional unit of deficit (ηt) results from several, mainly macroeconomic, factors.
Besides possible uncertainty about future budgetary policy (i.e. after current
policy makers’ term), the impact on sustainability is uncertain due to the lim-
ited knowledge of future economic growth, inflation and interest rates. The
required adjustments in future primary balances to redirect policy to a sustain-
able path might, for example, affect interest rates. Furthermore, when aiming
6Parallel to footnote 5, differentiating the price to be paid across member states accord-
ing to regional differences in the benefits of deficit reduction accommodates a more efficient
austerity program, although differentiation is not necessarily perceived justifiable based on
non-economical reasons.
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at stabilizing the debt level there are strict preconditions for the interest and
growth rates in order for the debt to converge. More recently, the role of finan-
cial markets’ expectations in determining the possibility of convergence has been
emphasized as well. Financial markets might create a self-fulfilling prophecy of
unsustainability via their influence on the interest burden. Irrespective of such
self-fulfilling prophecies, financial markets’ expectations can have a major influ-
ence on the rates of return in turbulent times.
Moreover, there is simultaneity in the uncertainty experienced by both the
regional and the federal governments as the ex post realizations of the savings
and damages are not determined independently from each other. For instance,
the variables underlying future economic growth (e.g. the fiscal multiplier) in-
fluence both the savings and the sustainability considerations. Consequently,
the correlation between the disturbance terms of the regional savings and the
federally evaluated damages, introduced below, will be assumed to be different
from zero.
It is worth noticing that a significant part of the above-mentioned uncer-
tainty is shaped by the business cycle. Implementing a borrowing constraint
based on the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CABB), as often the case in
practice, largely eliminates this component of uncertainty from both costs and
benefits. Although the methodology to determine the cyclical component has
been found to lack soundness at times, using the CABB governments are not
held accountable for the budgetary consequences of the business cycle. Nonethe-
less, other sources of uncertainty remain. Non-cyclical, non-discretionary inci-
dences such as socio-demographic changes are some.
The degree and type of uncertainty furthermore depend on the level of gov-
ernment and vary across the same level. The uncertainty resulting from exter-
nalities is an especially decisive factor at the higher level of government. As
mentioned above, federal governments take account of the negative spillovers
from expected unsustainability in their objective function. This is a consider-
ation subject to considerable uncertainty as it is hard to inventory all possible
positive and negative spillovers. Therefore, the federal objective function is
characterized by a disturbance term (ηt) incorporating this overall uncertainty
distinguishable form the regional uncertainty (θn,t). Likewise, there may be
stochastic differences across the same level of government due to varying de-
grees of stability in member states’ policy environment.7 Accordingly, distur-
bance terms θn,t are indexed by member state.
In any case, uncertainty is very likely to differ at both levels and across
different units at the same level. The uncertainty in the budgetary decision
process, moreover, is crucial for the optimality of the final outcome. Hence, in
what follows, I study the influence of budgetary uncertainty on the optimum
instrument for fiscal discipline.
7The principle of subsidiarity delegating responsibilities downwards as a result of the dif-
ferences in the awareness concerning the social desirability of a policy is rooted in those
interregional differences.
8
3.2 The Stochastic Model
Now, again consider a federation with N member states indexed n ∈ {1, ..., N}.
As before, dt = (d1,t, ..., dN,t) will be an N-vector comprising all member states’
deficits at time t. Yet, the stochastic relation linking the prevailing deficit dn,t
in state n at time t to its costs of reduction will be cn,t(dn,t, θn,t), where θn,t
is the disturbance term. This random variable is unobserved and unknown ex
ante.
As in Weitzman’s (1974), it is presumed that the random term characterizing
uncertainty is sufficiently small to justify second-order Taylor approximations
of generalized total savings and damage functions. Therefore, using a second-
order Taylor approximation of the member states’ savings functions around
dˆt = (dˆ1,t, ..., dˆN,t) and splitting the marginal savings at dˆn,t into a deterministic
component (i.e. its expectation; represented by the expectations operator E[•])
and a stochastic component resulting from budgetary uncertainty,
αn,t(θn,t) ≡ ∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)− E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
]
. (10)
the savings for the member state of one additional unit of deficit can be written
as follows:
∂
∂d1,t
s1,t(d1,t, θ1,t) ∼=
(
E
[
∂
∂dˆ1,t
s1,t(dˆ1,t, θ1,t)
]
+ α1,t(θ1,t)
)
+ ∂
2
∂dˆ21,t
s1,t(dˆ1,t, θ1,t) · (d1,t − dˆ1,t)
...
∂
∂dN,t
sN,t(dN,t, θN,t) ∼=
(
E
[
∂
∂dˆN,t
sN,t(dˆN,t, θN,t)
]
+ αN,t(θN,t)
)
+ ∂
2
∂dˆ2N,t
sN,t(dˆN,t, θN,t) · (dN,t − dˆN,t).
(11)
The stochastic component is assumed to be distributed such that its expected
value is zero: E[αn,t(θn,t)] = 0. Moreover, for simplicity, an unexpected shock is
assumed to be restricted to shifts in the marginal curves, leaving the functions’
curvature unchanged:
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t) ≡ E
[
∂2
∂ ˆdn,t
2 sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
]
. (12)
As noted in section 3.1, the savings uncertainty θn,t is asymmetric among
regions. The damages of a deficit, on the other hand, ought to be mainly valued
at the federal level of government. Hence, in addition to uncertainty on regional
savings, there is uncertainty on the federal damages of a deficit. Consequently,
the marginal damage is expressed as follows,
∂
∂dn,t
Dt(dt, ηt) ∼=
(
E
[ ∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
]
+ γt(ηt)
)
+∇dn,tDt(dˆt, ηt) · (dt − dˆt)
(13)
with
γt(ηt) ≡ ∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)− E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
]
and E[γt(ηt)] = 0. (14)
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Again, the disturbance term ηt is unobserved and unknown at the present time.
In case of the damage, however, the disturbance term is not member state spe-
cific, it relates to the overall deficit. Nonetheless, as stressed in section 3.1, both
components of uncertainty are not expected to be independently distributed.
E[αn,t(θn,t) · γt(ηt)] 6= 0. (15)
Furthermore, the unexpected shocks in the damage are also assumed to leave
the functions’ curvature unchanged at the supranational level,
∂2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt) ≡ E
[
∂2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
]
. (16)
A Borrowing Constraint To directly assign a quantitative borrowing con-
straint to each member state, the regulatory authority solves
Max
dt
E
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
sn,t(dn,t, θn,t)−Dt(dt, ηt)
]
. (17)
This optimization will result in dˆt, a N-vector comprising a deficit rule dˆn,t for
each region n, satisfying E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
]
= E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
]
.
Ex ante (forced) commitment to such quantitative goals may, however, result
in deadweight losses once the shocks are realized. After all, the ex ante do
not accommodate for such uncertainty as the incorporated in the model via
dn,t
MS
MD
E[MS]
MSH
E[MSn,t]
dinitialdn,t^
MSL
L
HMSn,t
MSn,t
E[MD] 
= MD
Figure 2: The Marginal Costs and Benefits of Deficit Reduction for the Over-
arching Regulator in case of a Borrowing Constraint
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θn,t. For clarification, figure 2 depicts the case for two different realizations
of the marginal savings function graphically. Superscripts H and L represent
the possible higher or lower realized marginal savings as a result of uncertainty.
The shaded triangles represent the losses in both cases as a consequence of the
realized equilibrium deviating from the optimum.
A Price Control In case of a quantity restriction, a deficit of dˆn,t prevailed
no matter what. If on the other hand, a penalty, p˜n,t, is used as the control,
achieving optimality implies fixing marginal damages such that marginal savings
will not exceed this level when choosing the deficit level. The deficit in region n
corresponding to such a penalty, represented by hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t), will be derived
from the realized marginal savings function of reduction. This is illustrated in
figure 3 for two different realizations of the marginal savings function. Super-
scripts H and L again represent the possible higher or lower realized marginal
savings as a result of uncertainty. The actual public balance will thus be de-
termined by stochastics as well as the penalty chosen. Therefore, an additional
channel of uncertainty prevails in case of a price control.
dn,t
MS
MD
E[MS]
E[MD] 
= MD
MSH
pn,t
~
dinitialE[hn,t(pn,t,θn,t)]~
MSL
hn,t(pn,t,θn,t)~ 
L hn,t(pn,t,θn,t)~ H
Figure 3: The Marginal Costs and Benefits of Deficit Reduction for the Over-
arching Regulator in case of a Price Control
More specifically, under the penalty p˜n,t member state n will have to adjust
its path of future fiscal balances {dn,t} to the respective hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t), given
p˜n,t and θn,t. In particular, the penalties p˜t = (p˜1,t, ..., p˜N,t) enforced by the
regulatory authority are the result of the following optimization problem:
Max
pt
E
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
sn,t(hn,t(pn,t, θn,t), θn,t)−Dt(ht(pt,θt), ηt)
]
, (18)
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implying
E
[
∂
∂hn,t
sn,t(hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t), θn,t) · ∂
∂p˜n,t
hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t)
]
= E
[
∂
∂hn,t
Dt(ht(p˜t,θt), ηt) · ∂
∂p˜n,t
hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t)
]
(19)
Again, deadweight losses may result from the realized shocks due to the
intervention by the federal authority, as illustrated by the shaded areas in 3.
Nonetheless, the losses under both types of instrument differ for similar shocks.
Hence, a comparison is fitting.
The Comparative Advantage In view of implementing fiscal discipline,
policy makers should ask themselves whether, under uncertainty, a penalty is
actually preferable over a quantitative borrowing constraint. Consider the case
in which the regulatory authority has the choice to set a borrowing constraint
(dˆn,t) according to (17) or solve for a penalty using (18). Then, the question
boils down to the comparison of the loss in case of a borrowing constraint (i.e. the
shaded area in figure 2) for a vector or realized shocks with that of a penalty (as
illustrated in figure 3). More specifically, the comparative advantage of prices
over quantities is the expected difference in gains obtained under the two modes
of control and can be expressed as follows:
∆ ≡ E
T∑
t=1
βt
[(
N∑
n=1
sn,t(hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t), θn,t)−Dt(ht(p˜t,θt), ηt)
)
−
(
N∑
n=1
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)−Dt(dˆt, ηt)
) ]
. (20)
In order to select the most suitable control instrument for achieving fiscal
discipline, hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t) has to be rewritten as a function of dˆn,t. Applying
the same manipulations as in the deterministic case but using the stochastic
marginal cost equations from (11), one obtains
hn,t(pn,t, θn,t) ∼= dˆn,t +
pn,t − E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
]
− αn,t(θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
. (21)
Again, using the fact that in case a price control is enforced upon the member
states, the realized price will equal the expected marginal savings of a deficit at
dˆt, equation (21) reduces to
hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t) ∼= dˆn,t − αn,t(θn,t)∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
. (22)
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Nevertheless, in case of uncertainty there is no equivalence between both disci-
plinary controls since the second component on the right-hand side conveys the
additional uncertainty characteristic of a price control in a stochastic setup.
Then, equation (22) deriving hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t) as a function of dˆn,t enables the
comparison of both controls. Substituting the approximated stochastic savings
and damage functions, with the corresponding deficits plugged in, into (20)
results in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. (Comparative Advantage) Let sn,t(dn,t, θn,t) be a regional stochas-
tic savings function and let Dt(dt, ηt) be a stochastic damage function, with
n ∈ {1, ..., N}, D′′t (dt, ηt) > 0, s′′n,t(dn,t, θn,t) < 0, s′n,t(0, θn,t) > D′t(0, ηt)
and D′t(dt, ηt) > s
′
n,t(dn,t, θt) for dn,t sufficiently large. Then, the comparative
advantage of prices over quantities is determined as follows:
∆ ∼=
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
σDs,t
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
−
N∑
n=1
σ2nn,t
2 ∂
2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
−
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
σnm,t
∂2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
2 ∂
2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
]
, (23)
where σ2nn,t are the mean squared errors in the marginal savings, σnm,t are the
covariances between regional marginal savings with m ∈ {1, ..., N} and σDs,t are
the contemporaneous covariances across the regional marginal savings and the
federal marginal damage.
Proof. The full derivation of (23) is reported in appendix A.3.
Thus, introducing simultaneous uncertainty into a multitier government
structure, such as federal budgetary policies, results in findings largely in line
with precursory results. Lemma 1 summarizes a first important result derived
from proposition 1. A graphical illustration is given by figures 4 to 7. A com-
plete overview of the signs of the comparative advantage in the limit found are
included in table 1.
Lemma 1. (Slopes) In accordance with Weitzman’s (1974) analysis without
correlated uncertainty, with correlated uncertainty flatter curves for the marginal
savings of a deficit and a steeper marginal damage of a deficit argue in favor
of a quantitative borrowing constraint. While a flatter marginal damage curve
favors a price control, policy makers turn more and more indifferent with respect
to the instrument to be used the steeper the marginal savings curves are.
Consequently, policy makers should be circumspect about the preconditions
fitting a borrowing constraint. For instance, as the externalities of higher deficits
grow detrimental to other regions, larger pressure is put on higher levels of gov-
ernment to intervene and a steeper marginal damage curve will result. Logi-
cally, rigid output controllability is highly valued in these cases. Implementing
a penalty would under-represent the existing pressure for fiscal discipline. In
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Table 1: Limit Signs of the Comparative Advantage of a Penalty vs. a Borrowing Constraint
Damage Savings Uncertainty Damage and Savings Uncertainty
Uncertainty σnm ≥ 0 σnm < 0 σnm ≥ 0 σnm < 0
Case σDs > 0 σDs = 0 σDs < 0 σDs > 0 σDs = 0 σDs < 0
lim
MD′→0
∆ 0 + + ? + + ? + +
lim
MD′→+∞
∆ 0 − − − − − − − −
lim
MS′→0
∆ 0 − − − − ? − − ?
lim
MS′→−∞
∆ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: The results hold for the cases in which the inequalities hold for all n and m combinations, with n 6= m. In case there would be
interregional differentiation in the variances one cannot draw unambiguous conclusions. Moreover, given its definition in equation (37) σ2nn is
obviously positive.
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Figure 7: Deadweight Losses in case
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particular, the regional marginal savings of an additional unit of deficit would be
put in the scale against a constant penalty, while the actual marginal damage to
be taken into account is greater for higher levels of the deficit. In such cases, the
slightest miscalculation or change would result in much lower or much higher
than desired budget balances and would thus needlessly endanger sustainability.
By contrast, with the marginal damage more constant over the deficit, i.e. pol-
icy makers are less concerned with fiscal sustainability or externalities as budget
balances vary, price constraints provide an inviting option since a price instru-
ment provides some flexibility in the amount borrowed in case actual marginal
savings diverge strongly from their expectations.
If the marginal savings curves become flatter and the economy becomes
more Ricardian, similar conclusions tend to hold. As regional policy makers
become more and more indifferent with respect to the deficit level, ∆ becomes
more negative implying a comparative advantage of implementing quantitative
borrowing constraints. Specifically, the remaining flexibility in regional fiscal
balances in case of a penalty system might turn out in its disadvantage. After all,
a comparable shock θn,t will have a much larger effect on region n’s fiscal balance
15
in case marginal savings are flat than if they were steep. The latter is undesirable
as long as policy makers are strongly concerned with fiscal sustainability or
externalities.
In addition to the slopes of the marginal savings and damage functions, the
policy makers’ choice should also take into account the savings’ uncertainty. In
particular, the comparative advantage depends linearly on the mean squared
errors in marginal savings. Furthermore, lemma 2 is found to hold.
Lemma 2. (Regional Savings Correlation) A positive correlation between the
regional marginal savings (i.e. ρnm,t =
σnm,t
σnn,t.σmm,t
> 0) is found to always favor
a borrowing constraint as the instrument for fiscal discipline.
Equation (24) clearly illustrates this result. Since the right hand side is strictly
negative in case the correlation of regional marginal savings is positive, higher
standard deviations will strengthen the case for a borrowing constraint. In case
of a negative correlation (ρnm,t < 0), on the other hand, a price control is
favored.
∂∆
∂(σnn,t · σmm,t) = −
ρnm,t · ∂2∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,tDt(dˆt, ηt)
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
(24)
Furthermore, the partial derivative of ∆ with respect to the correlation of re-
gional marginal savings is found to be unambiguously negative:
∂∆
∂ρnm,t
= −
σnn,t · σmm,t · ∂2∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,tDt(dˆt, ηt)
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
. (25)
Hence, as the shocks to the regions’ marginal savings turn more symmetric, a
borrowing constraint is more preferred.
As illustrated by the relation in (22), implementing a price control involves
an additional channel of uncertainty. This additional channel does not only
work on its own as in lemma 1, but also via its interaction with other mem-
ber states’ shocks. If shocks to regional marginal savings are symmetric, the
overall uncertainty is more outspoken (via the second order of approximation
of the federal damage function) and consequently, a price instrument is less ef-
ficient. Nonetheless, the fact that a price instrument leaves room for regional
cost uncertainty to play a role turns out to be an asset in case shocks are asym-
metrical and a penalty thus leaves room for regional shocks to compensate each
other. Increased uncertainty in regional savings, flatter regional marginal sav-
ings curves and a steeper federal marginal damage curve, moreover, results in a
greater impact of any degree of regional savings’ correlations.
Damage uncertainty, in its turn, influences the outcome only via its corre-
lation with the savings’ uncertainty.8 Therefore, consideration should also be
8As illustrated graphically in appendix B the deadweight losses for both policy instruments
do not differ as a result of isolated shocks to marginal damages.
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given to possibly correlated uncertainty of the federal marginal damage and
the regional marginal savings, as it may overturn the preferred instrument of
control.
Lemma 3. (Savings and Damage Correlation) Corresponding to Stavins’s (1996)
setting with simultaneous uncertainty but without multiple regulated units, a
positive correlation of the federal marginal damage and the regional marginal
savings (i.e. ρDs,t =
σDs,t
σDD,t.σnn,t
> 0) favors a quantitative borrowing constraint.
Consider
∂∆
∂(σDD,t · σnn,t) =
ρDs,t
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
, (26)
where σ2DD,t is the variance of the marginal damage, defined as:
σ2DD,t ≡ E
[(
∂
∂dn,t
Dt(dt, ηt)− E
[
∂
∂dn,t
Dt(dt, ηt)
])2]
∼= E[(γt(ηt))2]. (27)
When ρDs is positive, the right-hand side of equation (26) is strictly negative.
Consequently, in case of symmetric shocks, a quantity constraint becomes more
attractive as the standard deviations of the regional marginal savings and the
federal marginal damage grow larger. The opposite holds in case of a negative
correlation (i.e. asymmetric shocks).
Additionally, as shown by equation (28), the impact of the correlation coeffi-
cient on the comparative advantage of a price control over a borrowing constraint
is unambiguously negative.
∂∆
∂ρDs,t
=
σDD,t · σnn,t
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
(28)
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This is also becomes clear from the graphical illustrations in figures 8 and 9.
Both graphs illustrate the lemma in its most extreme form: the shocks are such
that there are deadweight losses using one policy instrument, while the other
is perfectly set such that losses are kept off. Increased damage and savings
uncertainty as well as a flatter marginal savings curve, moreover, result in a
greater impact of any degree of correlation.
Although quantitative constraints are probably the preferable instrument
in the majority of cases, especially the counter-argument based on asymmetric
uncertainty might be considered disturbing for present-day policy makers, as
expounded in the next subsection.
3.3 Policy Implications
The framework above comprehends the case of a federal government vis-a`-vis
the regions. Nevertheless, given the universality of the model, it could just as
well be the case for a monetary union (e.g. the EMU), in which a supranational
authority oversees member countries’ fiscal policies. Within a monetary union
externalities are clearly no exception either. Like regional excessive deficits,
spillover to other regions in a federation via the borrowing costs and the risks
accompanying possible unsustainability, national deficits have recently proven
to easily spillover to other union members. Moreover, at the supranational level,
the trade effects of austerity via the export channel are more likely to be taken
into account in the process of consolidation. Hence, supranational oversight
seems worthwhile.
Within the EMU, the role of regulator is attributed to the European Com-
mission (EC). In particular, the EC is bound to enforce the commitments made
in the Stability and Growth Pact. Building on the Treaty of Maastricht, it
requires member states’ deficits not to exceed 3 per cent of GDP. In addition,
the Pact inserted a medium term objective (MTO) for member states’ budgets
to be in balance or surplus in the medium term. The latter was revised in
2005 to allow countries with a debt level below 60 per cent of GDP to accrue a
cyclically adjusted budget balance (CABB) of -1 per cent in the medium term.9
More recently, the Six-Pack and the Fiscal Compact added to these quantita-
tive requirements in light of the great recession. An increase of the MTO for a
member state’s structural deficit to 0.5 per cent of GDP in case the country’s
public debt exceeds the threshold was carried through.
3.3.1 Vertical Simultaneity Concerns
The concern with respect to the simultaneity between shocks to national marginal
savings and shocks to union wide marginal damages (ρDs,t) plays a key role at
the supranational level. A positive correlation would imply that as a member
state’s marginal savings to further increase its deficit is higher than expected,
the supranational regulator is confronted with a higher marginal damage of
9The EC however was already requiring member states to submit their CABB for evaluation
from 2003 onwards.
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such a deficit increase in that particular country, implying that sustainability
and spillover concerns become more of an issue and a quantitative borrowing
constraint would be preferable. Moreover, this concern might overwhelm the
relative-slopes instrument recommendations summarized above.
Hence, as briefly mentioned in section 3.1, the term ρDs,t can be inter-
preted to give an indication of an uncertain factor influencing both levels of
government’s decisions. For instance, in case a higher deficit turns out to harm
the union more than expected by endangering sustainability (for instance, by
increasing interest rates more than economic growth) and the correlation is
negative because member states’ marginal savings are lower than expected, the
comparative advantage thus favors of a price control. Similarly, a penalty-based
system is preferred if the fiscal multiplier favors Keynesian deficit spending in-
stead and both the European policy makers and member states’ governments
agree on this. Thus, marginal damages are lower than expected, while marginal
savings are higher than expected. On the other hand, if both levels of gov-
ernment perceive their objective functions differently, the correlation will be
positive and borrowing constraints are ceteris paribus the optimal instrument
for achieving discipline.
For present-day EMU policy makers, this would mean that differing views on
policy objectives for the fiscal balance among the levels of government (e.g. as
a result of a national deficit bias) could rightly justify the European borrowing
constraints. Otherwise, they might be backfiring in terms of economic efficiency
as a penalty system would be preferred.
3.3.2 Horizontal Drivers of Inefficiency
Despite the convergence with respect to economic aspects such as trade, EMU
member states have been considered to still be asymmetric in many other re-
spects, for instance their business cycle behavior (see e.g. De Grauwe, 2012). In
other words, implying diverging marginal savings of a deficit for the different
member countries and making some more vulnerable to volatility. Consequently,
reinforcing the case against borrowing restrictions and possibly overwhelming
the above-mentioned relative-slopes and relative-shocks instrument recommen-
dations.
As pointed out by the model, as the asymmetry between shocks to national
marginal savings (ρnm,t) increases, the quantitative borrowing constraints en-
forced in the EMU are not the most efficient instruments to achieve fiscal dis-
cipline. More specifically, if shocks to budgetary policy are more asymmetric
and accordingly monetary policy becomes less useful in countering the shocks in
a monetary union, a borrowing constraint also leaves too little room to adjust
efficiently. Namely, those countries hit the most take on too much of the burden.
The latter is undesirable since it prevents an efficient form of hedging, which
would not require additional government intervention.
In case of a penalty, countries have an extra degree of freedom to adjust
for the asymmetric shocks, namely their fiscal balance. Thus, member states
are able to adjust their budget balances according to their relative ability and
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willingness to bear the costs of a deficit reduction, as expressed by the realized
marginal savings functions. As a result, the actual marginal savings of deficit re-
duction will diverge less from the marginal damage of doing so. Based on lemma
3, this is recommended if shocks are asymmetric - therefore, compensating each
other - and additionally externality concerns are not decisive.
For example, take the case of two countries forming a monetary union. Sup-
pose country A is hit by a recession, while country B’s demand is blooming.
To focus on the horizontal drivers of inefficiency assume there are no shifts in
marginal damages. Nonetheless, under a borrowing constraint both country A
and B have to adhere to the ex ante set budget balance. Given the increased
marginal costs of doing so for country A and the lower marginal costs of doing
so for B, the use of such an instrument is suboptimal. The respective efficiency
losses are portrayed by the shaded triangles in figures 10 and 11. The social
losses could be limited by using a penalty, as illustrated in figures 12 to 13. In
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E0
E*
dA,tdA,t
^
MSA,t
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Figure 10: Country A - Deficit Rule
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that case both country A and B would be inclined to strive for fiscal discipline,
yet A would choose to reduce its effort as its cuts are economically the most
demanding, while B would be inclined to be more austere than under the budget
constraint.10
10Note that a borrowing constraint as considered in the theoretical framework above does
also not provide in an increased effort during booms. Nonetheless, this critique does not hold
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The European budgetary regulation does diversify based on business cycles
via explicit escape clauses to the excessive deficit procedure based on growth
rates and additionally explicitly including rules based on the CABB. Thus,
providing room for maneuver, albeit limited. Nevertheless, the idea that the
EMU is a collection of historically, culturally and politically diverging nations
only contributes to the concerns raised since other types of shocks remain.
4 Concluding Remarks
The control of budgetary aggregates is not as straightforward as it is sometimes
thought to be. This paper considered two complicating considerations. Firstly,
the paper accounted for the large amount of uncertainty faced by policy mak-
ers when drawing up the budgets. A problem left seemingly untouched so far.
Secondly, the contradiction in preferences between the different levels of gov-
ernment in a multitier setup was explicitly modeled in order to account for the
externalities in terms of sustainability concerns and borrowing costs currently
faced by many federal states when striving for fiscal discipline and allocating
austerity efforts among their member states.
Accounting for exogenous shocks to both the region-specific savings and the
federation wide damages of a deficit results in three clear conclusions on the
impact of uncertainty on the optimality of federal policy makers’ decisions in
achieving fiscal discipline. Firstly, it was found that the choice between a quan-
tity constraint and a pecuniary penalty is determined directly by the uncertainty
in the regional savings of an additional unit of deficit. Secondly, the trade off
between instruments is determined only indirectly (via the correlation between
savings and damage uncertainty) by the uncertainty in the federal damage of
an additional unit of regional deficit, conveying possible spillovers among re-
gions. Thirdly, a negative correlation between the stochastic components in
member states’ marginal savings was found to plea in favor of a penalty-based
disciplinary system.
Applying the model to the supranational case furthermore pointed to two
qualifications of the quantitative borrowing constraints gaining more and more
ground in European fiscal policy regulation. While incorporating the standard
political economy argument in favor of disciplinary action using borrowing con-
straints (i.e. a deficit bias) consonantly as a key parameter for optimal instru-
ment recommendations, the model points out that the asymmetry in shocks to
the costs of austerity in the different EMU member states is detrimental. The
asymmetry present in current day Europe results in a comparative disadvantage
of a borrowing constraint as a means of control. Certainly once the heat of a
crisis wears off and sustainability concerns become subordinate. The EMU’s
current approach to disciplining member states is therefore highly likely to be
suboptimal if kept in place in the future. An alternative penalty-based system
for the case of the EMU. It can be countered rightly by considering the Stability Programs
that member states have to submit. These programs will also include required efforts once
recessions blow over.
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would be more efficient at hedging the EMU’s characterizing uncertainty in the
long run, yet not require any extra information.
In sum, policy makers either have to change strategy (i.e. instrument) in
order to achieve fiscal discipline more efficiently or strive for much stronger in-
tegration to make shocks more uniform (and hence make monetary policy more
powerful in countering them).11 Alternatively, they may consider complemen-
tary hedging schemes as suggested by Dre`ze (2000) and stressed once more in
Dre`ze and Durre´ (2013).
11As an alternative instrument one could possibly go even further in approximating efficiency
by creating a market for tradable deficit permits as suggested by Casella (1999).
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Matrix Notation of the Damage Function
If the real-valued scalar function Dt(dˆt) is differentiable and continuous over
the domain of the function, its gradient is
∇Dt(dˆt) =
(
∂
∂dˆ1,t
Dt(dˆt), ...,
∂
∂dˆN,t
Dt(dˆt)
)
, (29)
where dˆt = (dˆ1,t, ..., dˆN,t).
If the second-order partial derivatives of Dt all exist at the point dˆt,
H(Dt)nm(dˆt) =

∂2
∂dˆ21,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ2,t∂dˆ1,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ3,t∂dˆ1,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂2
∂dˆN,t∂dˆ1,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ1,t∂dˆ2,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ22,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ3,t∂dˆ2,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂2
∂dˆN,t∂dˆ2,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ1,t∂dˆ3,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ2,t∂dˆ3,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ23,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂2
∂dˆN,t∂dˆ3,t
Dt(dˆt)
...
...
...
. . .
...
∂2
∂dˆ1,t∂dˆN,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ2,t∂dˆN,t
Dt(dˆt)
∂2
∂dˆ3,t∂dˆN,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂2
∂dˆ2N,t
Dt(dˆt)

(30)
is the Hessian of Dt at dˆt.
A.2 Derivation of the Marginal Damage Functions
Writing equation (3) in full gives
Dt(dt) ∼= Dt(dˆt) +
(
∂
∂dˆ1,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂
∂dˆN,t
Dt(dˆt)
)
·
 d1,t − dˆ1,t...
dN,t − dˆN,t

+
1
2
(
d1,t − dˆ1,t . . . dN,t − dˆN,t
) ·

∂2
∂dˆ21,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂2
∂dˆN,t∂dˆ1,t
Dt(dˆt)
...
. . .
...
∂2
∂dˆ1,t∂dˆN,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂2
∂dˆ2N,t
Dt(dˆt)
 ·
 d1,t − dˆ1,t...
dN,t − dˆN,t

∼= Dt(dˆt) +
N∑
n=1
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt) · (dn,t − dˆn,t) + 1
2
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
(dn,t − dˆn,t) · ∂
2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,t
Dt(dˆt) · (dm,t − dˆm,t)
(31)
Thus, given the equality of mixed partials based on Clairaut’s theorem, the
marginal damage function is as follows, with i ∈ {1, ..., N}\{n}:
∂
∂dn,t
Dt(dt) ∼= ∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt) +
1
2
[
2(dn,t − dˆn,t) ∂
2
∂dˆ2n,t
Dt(dˆt) +
N∑
i=2
(di,t − dˆi,t) · ∂
2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆi,t
Dt(dˆt)
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+N∑
i=2
∂2
∂dˆi,t∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt) · (di,t − dˆi,t)
]
∼= ∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt) +
(
∂2
∂dˆ1,t∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt) . . .
∂2
∂dˆN,t∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt)
)
·
 d1,t − dˆ1,t...
dN,t − dˆN,t

∼= ∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt) +∇dn,tDt(dˆt) · (dt − dˆt) (32)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The comparative advantage of prices over quantities is the expected difference
in gains obtained under the two modes of control:
∆ ≡ E
T∑
t=1
βt
[(
N∑
n=1
sn,t(hn,t(p˜n,t, θn,t), θn,t)−Dt(ht(p˜t,θt), ηt)
)
−
(
N∑
n=1
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)−Dt(dˆt, ηt)
) ]
∼= E
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
(
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)− ∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t,θn,t)
]
+αn,t(θn,t)
·
(
αn,t(θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
)
− 1
2
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t) ·
(
αn,t(θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
)2)
−
N∑
n=1
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
−Dt(dˆt, ηt) +
N∑
n=1
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt,ηt)
]
+γt(ηt)
·
(
αn,t(θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
)
+
1
2
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
(
αn,t(θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
)
· ∂
2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt) ·
(
αm,t(θm,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
)
+Dt(dˆt, ηt)
]
where all the approximated total damage and total savings cancel out. Then,
under the presumptions that (a) a stochastic shock in marginal savings has no
impact on the curvature of the marginal savings
E
[(
αn,t(θn,t)−E [αn,t(θn,t)]
)
·
(
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)− E
[
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
])]
= 0,
(33)
(b) the covariance of shocks to marginal savings and marginal damages has
no impact on the curvature of the marginal savings either and (c) there is no
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covariance between the curvatures of regional marginal savings
E
[(
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)− E
[
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
])
·
(
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)− E
[
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
]) ]
= 0 (34)
working out the expectation reduces the former to:
∆ ∼=
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
E
[
γt(ηt) · αn,t(θn,t)
]
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
−
N∑
n=1
E
[
(αn,t(θn,t))
2
]
2 ∂
2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
−
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
E
[
αn,t(θn,t) · αm,t(θm,t)
] · ∂2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
2 ∂
2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
]
.
Consequently,
∆ ∼=
T∑
t=1
βt
[
N∑
n=1
σDs,t
∂2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
−
N∑
n=1
σ2nn,t
2 ∂
2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
−
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
σnm,t
∂2
∂dˆn,t∂dˆm,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
2 ∂
2
∂dˆ2n,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
∂2
∂dˆ2m,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
]
, (35)
with the mean squared errors (i.e. the bias) in the marginal savings defined as
σ2nn,t ≡ E
( ∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)− E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
])2
∼= E[(αn,t(θn,t))2], (36)
the covariances between regional marginal savings as
σnm,t ≡ E
[(
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)− E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
])
·
(
∂
∂dˆm,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)− E
[
∂
∂dˆm,t
sm,t(dˆm,t, θm,t)
]) ]
∼= E[αn,t(θn,t) · αm,t(θm,t)], (37)
with m ∈ {1, ..., N}, and the contemporaneous covariances across the regional
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marginal savings and the federal marginal damage as
σDs,t ≡ E
[(
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)− E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
Dt(dˆt, ηt)
])
·
(
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)− E
[
∂
∂dˆn,t
sn,t(dˆn,t, θn,t)
]) ]
∼= E[γt(ηt) · αn,t(θn,t)]. (38)
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B Graphical Appendix
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Figure 14: The Marginal Costs and Benefits of Deficit Reduction for the Over-
arching Regulator in case of a Benefit Shock and a Borrowing Constraint
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Figure 15: The Marginal Costs and Benefits of Deficit Reduction for the Over-
arching Regulator in case of a Benefit Shock and a Price Control
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